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FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CHINESE 
CONSTITUTIONS DURING THE HU JINTAO 
ADMINISTRATION 
JASON BUHI* 
Abstract: This Article is a close examination of how China’s dual constitution 
system—that is, the nexus of governing power as outlined between the State 
Constitution and the Communist Party Constitution—provides both jurisdic-
tional and substantive guidance to Chinese foreign policy makers. It especially 
focuses on the Hu Jintao administration (2002–2012) as the foremost example 
of grounding foreign policy in the dual constitutions of China. With the suc-
cess of the Hu administration, the Chinese constitutional law of foreign policy 
has become theoretically a unique extraterritorial projection of “the rule of 
law with Chinese characteristics,” with room for future development by both 
liberals and realists. Part I of this Article begins by introducing the jurisdic-
tional and substantive bases of the Chinese constitutional law of foreign poli-
cy. Part II sets out the specific contributions of the Hu Administration, and ex-
plains the linkage between the Scientific Development Outlook, the Socialist 
Harmonious Society platform, and the Peaceful Development strategy. Part III 
posits how the Chinese constitutions may have informed foreign policy deci-
sion-making regarding some of the biggest challenges of the Hu Jintao era. 
Finally, this Article predicts that the principal constitutional challenge that 
China will face in the foreseeable future is securing the vast amount of re-
sources it needs to maintain its domestic development while maintaining har-
monious relations with the rest of the developing world. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the early to mid-1970s, amidst widespread disillusionment over the 
Vietnam War, American veterans, politicians, lawyers, political scientists, 
media, and the public-at-large began a period of penitent reflection intended 
to reconstruct the constitutional boundaries of the practice of war and U.S. 
foreign relations.1 That era buzzed with discourse on the constitutional ba-
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 * Jason Buhi (Ph.D., The University of Hong Kong, expected 2015; J.D., Pennsylvania State 
University, 2006; B.S., Shepherd University, 2003; attorney Maryland & Washington D.C., 
U.S.A.). A working version of this paper was presented at the conference, “The Rule of Law with 
Chinese Characteristics in Transition” at the City University of Hong Kong in June 2013. 
 1  See Legislative Proposals Relating to the War in Southeast Asia: Hearings Before the 
Comm. on Foreign Relation, 92nd Cong. 120 (1971) (statement of John Kerry, former Navy Lieu-
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ses for all things related to the design and implementation of American for-
eign policy, including the power to make war, the limits of national security 
secrecy, and identifying the proper roles for the different branches of gov-
ernment, and of the public, in this decision-making process.2 Professor Lou-
is Henkin began his contemporary treatise, Foreign Affairs and the Consti-
tution, with the observation: 
Volumes about the American Constitution and about American 
foreign relations abound, but they are two different mountains of 
books. Those that deal with the Constitution say little about 
American foreign relations; the others expound, scrutinize, dis-
sect and criticize the international relations, foreign policy, and 
the “foreign-policy-making process” of the United States, but the 
controlling relevance of the Constitution is roundly ignored.3 
A similar claim could be made about the separate bodies of literature 
on Chinese constitutional law and foreign policy today.4 Although its cir-
cumstances are very different from those of the United States in the early 
1970s, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) of the early twenty-first cen-
                                                                                                                           
tenant, Vietnam Veterans Against the War). At the Congressional Fulbright Hearings in 1971, 
U.S. Navy Lieutenant John Kerry testified: 
We really have a constitutional crisis in this country right now. The Constitution un-
der test, and we are failing [sic]. We are failing clearly because the power of the Ex-
ecutive has become exorbitant because Congress has not wanted to exercise its own 
power, and so that is going to require some very fundamental changes. 
Id. John Kerry is the current U.S. Secretary of State. See Secretary Kerry, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2014). 
 2 See THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, at v (Francis 
O. Wilcox & Richard A. Frank eds., 1976). The effort culminated in the War Powers Resolution 
of 1973. See War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2006). 
 3 LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION, at vii (1972). 
 4 See infra notes 5–9 and accompanying text. There are large bodies of work on Chinese con-
stitutionalism and foreign policy, but neither camp attempts a linkage. For examples of constitu-
tionalism, see: ALBERT H.Y. CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (3rd ed. 2004); LIN FENG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN CHINA (2000); Larry 
Catá Backer, Party, People, Government and State: On Constitutional Values and the Legitimacy 
of the Chinese State-Party Rule of Law System, 30 B.U. INT’L L.J. 331 (2012). For examples of 
foreign policy studies, see: Zhu Liqun, The Domestic Sources of China’s Foreign Policy and Di-
plomacy, in CHINA’S “NEW” DIPLOMACY: TACTICAL OR FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE? 109, 109–22 
(Pauline Kerr et al. eds., 2008) (discussing China’s peaceful rise/peaceful development formula-
tion without ever citing constitutional roots); Thomas Kane, China’s Foundations: Guiding Prin-
ciples of Chinese Foreign Policy, in CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION 101, 101–15 
(Guoli Liu ed., 2004) (extensively quoting Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin, but not 
their constitutional contributions). Indeed, CONTEMPORARY CHINA AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY 
(Yang Fuchang et al. eds., 2002) is the only title I am aware of to include a discussion of the Chi-
nese constitutions in a primarily foreign policy work, although it is merely included as a primer on 
the Chinese political system. 
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tury is at a turning point in the conduct of its foreign affairs.5 Even though 
its dual constitutions claim to explicitly shape China’s foreign relations to a 
much higher degree than their American counterpart, the link between the 
development of Chinese constitutionalism and the conduct of Chinese for-
eign policy is almost never discussed. Perhaps the reasons for this are the 
same as those Professor Henkin identified to explain the divide that arose 
between American constitutional and foreign policy discourse. Henkin 
wrote: 
[This reflects] the impression that the Constitution and its law do 
not matter, or perhaps that, like other mechanisms that “work” 
smoothly, it can be taken for granted. The conduct of foreign rela-
tions seems long and far removed from any constitutional origins, 
confronting no constitutional limitations and generating no con-
stitutional issues. When, recurrently, foreign affairs explode into 
constitutional controversy, it comes as a surprise, and the partici-
pants themselves, and other foreign affairs “experts,” fumble and 
mumble in discussing the issues.6 
Another more contextual reason for the divide between Chinese consti-
tutionalism and foreign policy may be reflected in Ambassador Richard 
Solomon’s advice that, “[t]he Chinese distrust impersonal or legalistic nego-
tiations.”7 Although China’s rising power status has caused both external 
and internal paradigm shifts regarding the perception of its ascension, the 
possibility of a crisis of “foreign affairs explod[ing] into constitutional con-
troversy” is low precisely because the Chinese constitutional law of foreign 
affairs is very explicit.8 China’s foreign affairs are not only jurisdictionally 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Opinion: From Japan to the U.S., China Embarks on a 
Bolder Foreign Policy, CNN (Nov. 24, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/24/opinion/china-
foreign-policy/ (discussing China’s design and implementation of a bolder foreign policy) (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2014). 
 6 HENKIN, supra note 3, at 4–5. Yet there is room for practical distinction. The language of 
the 1970s conflated two distinct areas by suggesting that the bridge between them—the internal 
constitutional ramifications of extra constitutional and jurisdictional activities beyond the national 
territory—somehow became the entire field of analysis, thereby swallowing both the domestic 
realm of deep constitutionalism and the jurisdictional limits of foreign policy constitutionalism. 
The author notes the vast realist body of foreign policy literature. 
 7 RICHARD H. SOLOMON, CHINESE NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR: PURSUING INTERESTS THROUGH 
‘OLD FRIENDS’ 4, 205 (2nd ed. 2001). 
 8 See XIANFA pmbl., arts. 1, 29, 45, 53–55, 62, 63, 67, 81, 86, 89, 93, 94 (2004) (China); 
CONST. COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA General Program (2012) (China); HENKIN, supra note 3, at 
4–5. See generally SUSAN L. SHIRK, CHINA: FRAGILE SUPERPOWER (2008) (discussing China’s 
rise as a superpower from the perspective of a former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State); 
Qin Yaqing, Struggle for Identity: A Political Psychology of China’s Rise, in CHINA’S RISE IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 249, 249–69 (Brantly Womack ed., 2010) (discussing China’s growth 
as a Chinese professor and vice president of China Foreign Affairs University). 
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delegated by, but also substantively instructed by express provisions of the 
State and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) constitutions, which are subject 
to interpretation by the political branches of government, rather than inde-
pendent judicial review.9 Therefore, I submit that China’s constitutional dis-
course is important for understanding the normative approach to Chinese 
foreign policy. 
The Hu Jintao administration particularly advanced the seamlessness 
between Chinese constitutionalism and foreign policy.10 Chairman Hu made 
China’s international relations a fundamental plank of his constitutional 
platform.11 His government promoted the “Peaceful Development” formula-
tion of Chinese foreign policy, in tandem with the substantive constitution-
alism of the “Scientific Development Outlook” and its goal of creating a 
“Socialist Harmonious Society.”12 As this tripartite linkage became more 
explicit, China’s leaders sought to wed their foreign and domestic policies 
in an unprecedented way.13 The official CCP stance on its various policies is 
that there is a single ideological line that began in the time of Deng Xiao-
ping and has continued through its most recent manifestation—the Scien-
tific Development Outlook.14 Because of the effort to unify all Chinese pol-
icy in a single ideological line, the Chinese constitutional law of foreign 
policy has become a unique extraterritorial projection of “socialism with 
Chinese characteristics.” 15  From a practical standpoint, this enterprise 
should not be surprising, given that the bodies responsible for developing 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See M. Ulric Killion, Building Up China’s Constitution: Culture, Marxism, and the WTO 
Rules, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 563, 578–79 (2008). 
 10 See Larry Catá Backer, The Rule of Law, the Chinese Communist Party, and Ideological 
Campaigns: Sange Daibiao (the “Three Represents”), Socialist Rule of Law, and Modern Chinese 
Constitutionalism, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 90 (2006); Hu Jintao, Chairman of 
the Chinese Communist Party, Guanyu Goujian Shehui Zhuyi Heshe Shehui Jianghua (关于构建
社会主义和谐社会讲话) [Speech at the Central Party School on the Building of a Socialist Har-
monious Society] (Feb. 19, 2005), available at http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2005-06/27/content_9700
.htm [hereinafter Hu’s Speech]. 
 11 See Hu’s Speech, supra note 10. 
 12 See id.; DAVID SHAMBAUGH, CHINA’S COMMUNIST PARTY: ATROPHY AND ADAPTATION 
103–27 (2008); China’s National Defense in 2006, STATE COUNCIL INFORMATION OFFICE, http://
www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2014). 
 13 See SHAMBAUGH, supra note 12 at 103–27; China’s National Defense in 2006, supra note 
12. 
 14 See CONST. COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA General Program para. 7 (2012) (“Since the 
Party’s Sixteenth National Congress, the Chinese Communists with Comrade Hu Jintao as their 
chief representative, following the guidance of Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought 
of Three Represents, have gained a deep understanding of major questions such as what kind of 
development China should achieve under new conditions and how it should achieve it to meet new 
requirements for development and answered these questions, and thus developed the Scientific 
Outlook on Development . . . .”). 
 15 See generally id. (stating this goal fifteen times throughout the constitution, starting in 
paragraph one). 
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China’s domestic constitutionalism are the same bodies charged with the 
ultimate management of foreign policy.16 
This Article analyzes Chinese foreign policy from the perspective of 
Chinese constitutional law. Ambassador Solomon encouraged a generation 
of Chinese specialists to “understand the PRC political context and the style 
of your Chinese interlocutor.”17 One way these specialists could understand 
the PRC political context is by studying the dual constitutions, the highest 
official statements of China’s governing norms and cultural narrative.18 In-
deed, by linking its foreign and domestic policies under the umbrella of 
constitutional law, the dual constitutions communicate China’s intentions 
both to its people and the outside world. Furthermore, China’s foreign poli-
cy actions are readily interpretable (at least in hindsight) through the lens of 
normative constitutionalism. Nonetheless, the Chinese approach remains 
thoroughly pragmatic, leaving room for both liberal and realist interpreta-
tions for future development of the Chinese constitutional law of foreign 
policy. Whatever the perspective of the observer, the exercise conducted 
herein has relevance because: 
[F]oreign relations . . . cannot be understood in the light of the 
Constitution alone, but they cannot be understood without it, for it 
continues to be shaped by the institutions and the actions that de-
termine them. If the conduct of foreign relations seems beset by 
politics rather than governed by law, it is the law of the Constitu-
tion that gives the politics its form and much of its content. Even 
the extra-constitutional institutions and processes which often 
seem to dominate the conduct of foreign relations are offspring of 
the Constitution and of needs created by its blueprint for govern-
ment.19 
This Article explores the relationship between Chinese constitutional 
law and foreign policy practice, and asserts that constitutional norms guide 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See XIANFA art. 67(1) (2004). The locus of power of the Chinese state is the national peo-
ple’s congress standing committee, which has ultimate decision making power over key decisions 
as well as the ability to interpret the Chinese constitutions. See SHIRK, supra note 8, at 43–44. 
 17 See SOLOMON, supra note 7, at 8–10. This is the eighth of eleven suggestions that the Am-
bassador shares. Id. 
 18 See XIANFA pmbl. para. 13 (2004) (“This Constitution, in legal form, affirms the achieve-
ments of the struggles of the Chinese people of all ethnic groups and defines the basic system and 
basic tasks of the state; it is the fundamental law of the state and has supreme legal authority. The 
people of all ethnic groups, all state organs, the armed forces, all political parties and public or-
ganizations and all enterprises and institutions in the country must take the Constitution as the 
basic standard of conduct, and they have the duty to uphold the dignity of the Constitution and 
ensure its implementation.”); CONST. COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA General Program para. 7 
(2012). 
 19 HENKIN, supra note 3, at 7. 
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foreign policy in ways that are not totally appreciated. Part I introduces both 
the structural (jurisdictional) and normative (substantive) dimensions of the 
constitutional bases of Chinese foreign policy. Part II explains the deep con-
stitutionalism of the Hu Jintao administration and culminates in a discussion 
of the tripartite linkage between the Scientific Development, Socialist Har-
monious Society, and Peaceful Development statements of constitutional 
law and foreign policy. Part III discusses several of the most serious foreign 
policy decisions of the Hu administration, including the management of 
Taiwan, the South China Sea, African investments, and rising international 
environmental awareness, in order to demonstrate how China’s dual consti-
tutions may have instructed its foreign policy apparatus. Based on these 
events and the letter of the constitutions, this Article predicts that the prin-
cipal normative-constitutional challenge that China will face is securing the 
vast amount of resources it needs to continue developing while maintaining 
harmonious relations with the rest of the developing world. 
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY 
“Foreign affairs are national affairs,”20 and national constitutions pro-
vide the blueprints for the functioning of states.21 China’s dual constitutions 
outline the distribution of governing authority in China.22 Successive gener-
ations of Chinese leadership have committed the PRC government to fol-
lowing “the Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics” and acting in con-
formity with the constitutions.23 Meanwhile, academics and reformers have 
increasingly pushed for the PRC to follow their own interpretations—based 
on international human rights norms—of the Rule of Law with Chinese 
Characteristics.24 
Any confusion about the Chinese constitutional law of foreign affairs 
may be the result of confusion about the dual constitutional system. China’s 
State Constitution outlines the mechanics of the State’s administrative appa-
ratus, and the CCP constitution outlines the Chinese Communist Party’s 
political machine.25 As Professor Larry Catá Backer states: 
                                                                                                                           
 20 Id. at 15. 
 21 See id. 
 22 See Backer, supra note 4, at 370–71. See generally XIANFA (2004) (laying out the organi-
zation of the State and the relationship between the State apparatus and the CCP); CONST. COM-
MUNIST PARTY OF CHINA (2012) (organizing and institutionalizing political authority). 
 23 See Backer, supra note 4, at 405–06; Xi Jinping Says All Must Act in Conformity with Con-
stitution, Laws, XINHUA (Feb. 24, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-02/24/c_
132189143.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2014). 
 24 See Edward Wong & Jonathan Ansfield, Reformers Aim to Get China to Live Up to Own 
Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2013, at A5. 
 25 See Backer, supra note 4, at 370–71. 
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[I]t is important to understand the constitutional system as being 
comprised of two documents—the Chinese [State] Constitution of 
1982 and the constitution of the CCP, the party in power. The for-
mer lays out the organization of the state and the relationship be-
tween the state apparatus and the party in power . . . the later organ-
izes and institutionalizes the manifestation of political authority 
within the nation.26 
No understanding of the Chinese constitutional order is complete 
without reading both constitutions. The documents are meant to be read to-
gether, as evidenced by the Preamble of the State Constitution, which ex-
plicitly defers to the leadership of the CCP,27 and Article One of the State 
Constitution, which refers to the “people’s democratic dictatorship,” the 
CCP.28 In turn, the CCP Constitution confirms that the Party leads the peo-
ple in overcoming the nation’s most difficult challenges, through “political, 
ideological, and organizational leadership.”29 At least one scholar considers 
“Leadership of the Communist Party” to be one of the “Four Cardinal Prin-
ciples” of Chinese Constitutional Law.30 Once one understands the assumed 
separation of power between the administrative and the political, one can 
interpret the jurisdictional and normative provisions of the dual constitu-
tions regarding the design of foreign policy. 
A. The Jurisdictional Constitutional Bases of the Chinese  
Foreign Policy Apparatus 
This section introduces the jurisdictional delegation of constitutional 
authority for the management of foreign affairs. The Chinese dual constitu-
tions assign foreign affairs duties more clearly than their American counter-
part.31 The PRC government does not have an American-style separation of 
                                                                                                                           
 26 Id. 
 27 See XIANFA pmbl. paras. 6, 7 (2004). 
 28 Id. art. 1. 
 29 CONST. COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA General Program para. 28 (2012). 
 30 LIN FENG, supra note 4, at 23–35. The other three general concepts are the Principle of 
Guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, the Principle of People’s Democratic 
Dictatorship, and the Principle of Adherence to Socialism. See id; see also DENG XIAOPING, Up-
hold the Four Cardinal Principles: March 30, 1979, in SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING 
VOLUME II 1975–1982 (2001), available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/
b1290.html (“The socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the Com-
munist Party and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought—all these are tied up with democ-
racy.”). 
 31 Compare U.S. CONST. arts. I, §§ 8, 10, II, III, § 2, with XIANFA (2004), and CONST. COM-
MUNIST PARTY OF CHINA (2012). Although other sections of the U.S. Constitution can have an 
indirect effect on U.S. foreign relations, the instructive provisions are those herein. See U.S. 
CONST. arts. I, §§ 8, 10, II, III, § 2. The first mention of foreign policy powers is in Article I, § 8, 
granting Congress, among other things, the power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, 
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powers among theoretically co-equal branches of government. 32  Rather, 
Article 57 of the State Constitution makes an explicit grant of administra-
tive power, saying, “The National People’s Congress (NPC) of the People’s 
Republic of China is the highest organ of state power. Its permanent body is 
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC).”33 
The State Constitution grants administrative power to the NPC and 
NPCSC in several areas that touch upon foreign affairs.34 State Constitution 
Article 62 grants the NPC the power to “decide on the choice of . . . Minis-
ters in charge of Ministries,”35 to elect the Chairman of the Central Military 
Commission (CMC) and make other CMC appointments,36 to examine and 
approve the State budget,37 to establish special administrative regions,38 and 
“to decide on questions of war and peace.”39 
Meanwhile, State Constitution Article 67 grants the NPCSC the fol-
lowing foreign affairs powers: to supervise the work of the State Council 
and the CMC;40 to decide upon the appointment of Ministers and CMC 
posts (when the NPC is not in session);41 to decide upon the appointment 
and recall of ambassadors;42 to decide on the ratification and abrogation of 
“treaties and important agreements” concluded with foreign States;43 and to 
declare war (when the NPC is not in session).44 Furthermore, State Consti-
tution Article 70 establishes a Foreign Affairs Committee under the auspices 
of the NPC and NPCSC.45 
                                                                                                                           
define offenses against the law of nations, declare war, and provide for the armed services. Id. art. 
I, § 8. Article I, § 10, forbids the states from pursuing independent foreign policies. Id. art. I, § 10. 
Article II defines the formal powers of the President, which include commanding the armed forc-
es, making treaties (provided two thirds of the Senators concur), nominating and with the consent 
of the Senate appointing Ambassadors. Id. art. II. Article III, § 2, assigns the Supreme Court pow-
er over cases arising from Treaties, original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, appel-
late jurisdiction in all Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and between a State, or the 
Citizens thereof, and foreign States. Id. art. III, § 2. 
 32 See XIANFA art. 57 (2004); LIN FENG, supra note 4, at 62–63. 
 33 XIANFA art. 57 (2004). 
 34 See id. arts. 62, 67. 
 35 Id. art. 62(5). 
 36 Id. art. 62(6). 
 37 Id. art. 62(10). 
 38 Id. art 62(13). 
 39 Id. art 62(14). 
 40 Id. arts. 67(6), 94. Article 94 restates that the CMC Chairman is responsible to the NPC and 
NPCSC. Id. art. 94. 
 41 Id. art. 67(11). 
 42 Id. art. 67(13). 
 43 Id. art. 67(14). 
 44 Id. art. 67(18). 
 45 Id. art. 70. 
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Though both the NPC and the NPCSC are charged with exercising the 
administrative authority of the State,46 the NPCSC enjoys a higher status.47 
The NPCSC oversees the election of deputies to the NPC.48 When the NPC 
is not in session, the NPCSC formally assumes decision-making authority 
over several areas that the NPC nominally controls.49 Furthermore, whereas 
State Constitution Article 62 grants the NPC power to amend the constitu-
tion, State Constitution Article 67 grants the NPCSC the sole power to in-
terpret the constitution.50 
The Chinese executive branch is charged with conducting certain regular 
foreign policy functions, under the supervision of the NPC and NPCSC.51 
Ceremonial powers are reserved for the Chinese President, who is elected by 
the NPC.52 The President appoints the Premier, Ministers, and State Council 
members, subject to NPC and NPCSC approval.53 The State Council appa-
ratus, “the highest organ of state administration,” is charged with executing 
laws and administrative will in internal and external affairs. 54  The State 
Council includes the heads of Ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, which has authority to conduct foreign affairs, to conclude treaties 
and agreements with foreign States (which must be ratified by the 
NPC/ NPCSC),55 and to protect the rights and interests of Chinese nationals 
residing abroad.56 
As stated, confusion over the Chinese constitutional law of foreign af-
fairs may owe in part to overall confusion about its dual constitutional sys-
tem.57 According to the CCP Constitution, the CCP “leads the people” in the 
nation’s most arduous tasks,58 “persists in its leadership over the People’s 
Liberation Army,” 59  and “adheres to an independent foreign policy of 
peace.”60 The CCP Constitution also sets out the CCP’s Marxist-Leninist 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See id. art. 58. 
 47 See id. arts. 59, 67(1). 
 48 Id. art. 59. 
 49 See id. art. 61. 
 50 See id. arts. 62, 67(1). 
 51 Id. arts. 80, 81. Articles 80 and 81 permit the President to conduct several acts performed 
by heads of state pursuant to decisions the NPC and the NPCSC. See id. He may appoint and re-
move the Ministers, proclaim martial law (later amended to “a state of emergency”), proclaim 
war, issue mobilization orders, receive foreign representatives, appoint and recall ambassadors, 
and ratify and abrogate treaties all in accordance with NPC approval. Id. 
 52 See id. art. 79. 
 53 See id. art. 80. 
 54 Id. art. 85; see id. art. 89. 
 55 See id. arts. 86, 89(9). 
 56 See id. art. 89(11). 
 57 See supra notes 24–29 and accompanying text. 
 58 See CONST. COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA General Program (2012). 
 59 Id. General Program para. 18. 
 60 Id. General Program para. 21. 
250 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 37:241 
organizational structure.61 According to Professor Wang Cungang, the CCP 
bodies with the most influence on China’s foreign policy are the CCP Cen-
tral Committee, the CCP Central Committee Political Bureau (Politburo), 
the Politburo Standing Committee, the Central Foreign Affairs Leading 
Group, and the Central National Security Work Leading Group.62 Dr. Susan 
Shirk, Former Deputy Assistant of State, described the jurisdictional bound-
aries between the State administrative apparatus and CCP political leader-
ship in China: Fragile Superpower, writing: 
The politicians in the Standing Committee of the Politburo take 
charge of policies toward the United States, Japan, and Taiwan [as 
opposed to foreign relations towards the other countries in the 
world, which is left to the Foreign Ministry] because they consider 
them “sensitive.” In other words, they are domestic hot-button is-
sues to which the public pays a lot of attention. Under Jiang Zemin, 
two high-level interagency groups of ministers similar to the U.S. 
National Security Council—the Foreign Affairs Leading Small 
Group and the Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group—became the 
locus for decision making. Hu Jintao continues this practice, lead-
ing and regularly meeting with both groups.63 
Others have asserted that the core foreign policy decision-making group 
was ultimately even smaller, consisting of just Hu Jintao, first secretary Xi 
Jinping, and secretary of the Foreign Affairs Leadings Group Dai Bingguo.64 
In any event, it is proper for State apparatus to defer to the PRC’s political 
organs for important foreign policy decision-making, because of the inherent-
ly political nature of such issues.65 Doing so is in line with the United States’ 
political question doctrine, which leaves foreign relations to the political 
branches.66 Naturally, the ruling party will have the power to develop the na-
                                                                                                                           
 61 See id. General Program para. 4. See generally LIN FENG, supra note 4, at 48–56 (discuss-
ing the influence of Marx’s, Engels’s, and Lenin’s theory on the CCP). 
 62 Wang Cungang (王存刚), Dangjin zhongguo de waijiao zhengce: Shei zai zhiding? Shei 
zai yingxiang? (当今中国的外交政策：谁在制定？谁在影响？) [China’s Foreign Policy To-
day: Who Designs It? Who Does It Affect?], WAIJIAO PINGLUN (外交评论) [FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
REVIEW], no. 2, 2012, at 4. 
 63 SHIRK, supra note 8, at 44. Dr. Shirk’s analysis echoes an analysis by Hongyi Harry Lai. 
External Policymaking Under Hu Jintao—Multiple Players and Emerging Leadership, 41 ISSUES 
& STUD. 209, 209–44 (2005). 
 64 See Alastair Iain Johnston, How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?, 37 
INT’L SECURITY 7, 35 (2013). 
 65 See infra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. In effect, Professor David Shambaugh as-
serts that the NPC remains a “puppet legislature that essentially rubber-stamps party policies” 
because the state apparatus must defer to CCP leadership in all political matters. SHAMBAUGH, 
supra note 12, at 179. 
 66 See generally Louis Henkin, Vietnam in the Courts of the United States: “Political Ques-
tions,” 63 AM. J. INT’L L. 284 (1969) (explaining the political question doctrine). 
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tion’s foreign and internal policies. 67  The seamless development between 
China’s internal and foreign policy affairs, and the linkage of both to constitu-
tional law is what is unique about the Chinese context. 
B. The Normative Constitutional Bases of Chinese Foreign Policy Practice 
China’s dual constitutions both include deep, substantive provisions 
for the proper conduct of domestic and foreign policy affairs. 68 For in-
stance, the State Constitution insists that: 
China consistently carries out an independent foreign policy and 
adheres to the five principles of [1] mutual respect for sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, [2] mutual non-aggression, [3] non-inter-
ference in each other’s internal affairs, [4] equality and mutual ben-
efit, and [5] peaceful coexistence in developing diplomatic rela-
tions and economic and cultural exchanges with other countries 
. . . .69 
The “Five Principles” were adopted by Mao Zedong and incorporated 
into the 1949 Common Program, the PRC’s original governing document.70 
They have been repeated in every State constitution promulgated since, in-
cluding the current CCP Constitution, as well as in the 1954 Panchsheel 
Treaty between China and India.71 
The dual constitutions are the results of years of Chinese constitutional 
theory. Four of China’s first five paramount leaders stamped their imprint 
on the dual constitutions by incorporating the titles of their primary political 
platforms into them.72 Both the Preamble of the State Constitution and the 
text of the CCP Constitution recognize, in addition to adherence to the ide-
ology of Marxism-Leninism, 73 the ideological guidance of Mao Zedong 
                                                                                                                           
 67 See Wang, supra note 62, at 4. 
 68 See XIANFA pmbl. (2004); CONST. COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA General Program para. 
22 (2012). 
 69 XIANFA pmbl. (2004). 
 70 China’s Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN 
AFF. OF CHINA (Nov. 17, 2000), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18053.htm (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2014). 
 71 See id.; CONST. COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA General Program para. 22 (2012) (“[The 
CCP] develops relations between China and other countries on the basis of the five principles of 
mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in 
each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.”). 
 72 See infra notes 73–78 and accompanying text. No explicit contribution is recorded from 
Hua Guofeng, the transitional figure between Mao and Deng. See XIANFA (2004); CONST. COM-
MUNIST PARTY OF CHINA (2012). 
 73 See XIANFA pmbl. (2004); CONST. COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA General Program (2012) 
(“Marxism-Leninism brings to light the laws governing the development of the history of human 
society. Its basic tenets are correct and have tremendous vitality.”). 
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Thought,74 Deng Xiaoping Theory,75 and Jiang Zemin’s Important Thought 
of the Three Represents. 76 Hu Jintao’s major contribution, the Scientific 
Development Outlook, was spirited into the CCP Constitution in 2007.77 In 
2012, the Scientific Development Outlook was the subject of a major dis-
cursive amendment which, if tradition holds, is a prelude to its incorpora-
tion into the State Constitution in the near future.78 
Each iteration of new substantive constitutionalism claims to refine the 
ones before it,79 an example of the ongoing national commitment to renew 
                                                                                                                           
 74 See XIANFA pmbl. (2004); CONST. COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA General Program para. 4 
(2012) (“[I]ntegrating the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the 
Chinese revolution. Mao Zedong Thought is Marxism-Leninism as applied and developed in Chi-
na . . . .”). 
 75 See XIANFA pmbl. (2004); CONST. COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA General Program para. 5 
(2012). The CCP Constitution defined Deng Xiaoping Theory in part as: “shift[ing] the focus of 
the work of the whole Party onto economic development and carr[ying] out reform and opening to 
the outside world, ushering in a new era of development in the cause of . . . building of socialism 
with Chinese characteristics.” CONST. COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA General Program para. 5 
(2012). 
 76 See XIANFA pmbl. (2004); CONST. COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA General Program para. 6 
(2012). The CCP Constitution defined the Three Represents by stating in part that: “[It] reflects 
new requirements for the work of the Party and state arising from the developments and changes 
in China and other parts of the world today; it serves as a powerful theoretical weapon for 
strengthening and improving Party building and for promoting self-improvement . . . .” CONST. 
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA General Program para. 6 (2012). 
 77 See Cary Huang & Teddy Ng, Hu Jintao’s ‘Scientific Development’ to Live on in Revised 
Constitution, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/
article/1077395/hu-jintaos-scientific-development-live-revised-constitution (last visited Mar. 26, 
2014). 
 78 See id. This will likely occur in 2014. Deng Xiaoping Theory was added to the CCP Con-
stitution in 1997, months after his death, and to the State Constitution two years later. See Zou 
Keyuan, The Party and the Law, in THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY IN REFORM 77, 79–80 
(Kjeld Erick Brodsgaard & Zheng Yongnian eds., 2006). Three Represents ideology was added to 
the CCP Constitution upon the retirement of Jiang Zemin from the post of General Secretary of 
the CCP in 2002 and added to the State Constitution two years later in 2004. See id. at 80. Alt-
hough the first iteration of Scientific Development Concept was spirited into the CCP Constitution 
in 2007, when Hu Jintao still had a full term in office ahead of him, the significant discursive 
amendment of 2012 may have restarted the constitutional clock. See Backgrounder: Major Previ-
ous Amendments to CPC Constitution, PEOPLE DAILY (Oct. 21, 2007), http://english.peopledaily.
com.cn/90002/92169/92190/6287688.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2014); Full Text of Resolution on 
Amendment to CPC Constitution, CHINA DAILY (Nov. 14, 2012), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/2012-
11/14/content_15927800.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2014); Hu Jintao Re-elected CPC Chief for Sec-
ond Term, TIMES OF INDIA (Oct. 22, 2007), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/Hu-
Jintao-re-elected-CPC-Chief-for-second-term/articleshow/2480428.cms?referral=PM (last visited Mar. 
26, 2014). Hu’s term as General Secretary expired in 2012. See Checkered End-of-Term Report Card 
for Hu Jintao, CNN (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/08/world/asia/china-hu-jintao-
report-card-florcruz/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2014). 
 79 See CONST. COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA General Program (2012). For instance, Deng 
Xiaoping Theory is described in the CCP Constitution as: 
the outcome of the integration of the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism with the 
practice of contemporary China and the features of the times, a continuation and de-
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the official CCP ideological line.80 Through this canonization process, which 
incorporates the political platforms of past leaders into the PRC’s dual consti-
tutions, the CCP claims an unbroken chain of title to the utilization of Marx-
ism-Leninism as its guide to action.81 This claim persists even though Marx-
ism-Leninism itself has been redefined several times since the 1950s, with its 
latest manifestation being the Scientific Development Outlook.82 These plat-
forms are the context in which one should view the Chinese constitutional 
law of foreign policy, which the Hu Administration attempted to merge with 
domestic constitutionalism. 
II. THE PILLARS OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE  
HU JINTAO ADMINISTRATION 
A. The Constitutional “Scientific Development Outlook” 
Like his predecessors, Chairman Hu introduced several policy formu-
lations and frameworks into the CCP’s governing lexicon. His signature 
platform, the “Scientific Development Outlook” (Kexue Fazhanguan, also 
known simply as “Scientific Development”), was first conceptualized as an 
extension of Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” (Sange Diabiao) in 2003.83 
                                                                                                                           
velopment of Mao Zedong Thought under new historical conditions; it represents a 
new stage of development of Marxism in China, it is Marxism of contemporary 
China. 
Id. para. 5. Three Represents is described as “a continuation and development of Marxism-
Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory.” Id. para. 6. 
 80 See id. para. 6. From a comparative perspective, it would almost be as if the more renown 
American political platforms—Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society, 
and Ronald Reagan’s Reaganomics, for example—were each explicitly defined in such a way to 
be coherent successions, endowed with interpretive force, and amended into the Preamble of the 
United States Constitution. Compare id., with U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 81 CONST. COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA General Program paras. 2–7 (2012). 
 82 See id. See generally V.I. LENIN, “LEFT-WING” COMMUNISM, AN INFANTILE DISORDER: A 
POPULAR ESSAY IN MARXIAN STRATEGY AND TACTICS (1940) (rejecting criticism that he (Lenin) 
had been too compromising, and arguing that a strategic commitment to Marxism justifies tactical 
flexibility). 
 83 See Hu Jintao, Chairman, Communist Party of China, Report Delivered at the 17th Party 
Congress § III: Thoroughly Applying the Scientific Outlook on Development para. 2 (Oct. 15, 
2007), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/24/content_6938749_2.htm [here-
inafter 17th Party Report]; Hu Jintao, Zai “Sange Daibiao” Yantaohui Shangde Zhongyao 
Jianghua (在”三个代表”研讨会上的重要讲话) [Speech at the Theoretical Discussion Meeting on 
the Important Thought of the “Three Represents”] (July 1, 2003), available at http://www.people.
com.cn/GB/shizheng/1024/1946147.html. The Three Represents are often stated as: 
1. The Party should represent the advanced productive forces in society, 
2. The Party should represent the advanced modern culture, and 
3. The Party should represent the interests of the vast majority of the people. 
SHAMBAUGH, supra note 12, at 111. Chairman Hu, realizing that in order to adapt to the new 
realities of China’s reform the CCP must reflect the fundamental interests and common aspirations 
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Far less narrowly-tailored than the Three Represents, Scientific Develop-
ment was designed as an umbrella concept, encompassing a wide range of 
policies.84 Early iterations of the Scientific Development Outlook included 
topics as diverse as education, energy, the environment, ethnic minority re-
lations, State-owned enterprise reform, and anti-corruption.85 Although its 
final articulation is still being authored, as of the time of this writing, the 
CCP Constitution includes this definition: 
[T]he Scientific Outlook on Development . . . puts people first 
and calls for comprehensive, balanced and sustainable develop-
ment . . . It is the crystallization of the collective wisdom of the 
[CCP] and a guiding ideology that must be upheld and applied in 
developing socialism with Chinese characteristics.86 
Some critics believe that the most tangible ways to “put people first” and 
ensure “comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development” 87  are to 
narrow the income gap, lessen regional development disparities, and strive 
for a more evenly developed society.88 To do so in the context of China 
would require a platform for monumental social transformation. 
B. The Political “Socialist Harmonious Society” Platform 
The most developed theorem within Scientific Development is a soci-
oeconomic vision which scholars have summarized as “Socialist Harmoni-
ous Society” (Shehuizhuyi de Hexie Shehui). This focus on bringing about a 
“Socialist Harmonious Society” is meant to indicate China’s change in fo-
cus from pursuit of unbridled economic growth to overall social balance 
and harmony. 89 As one observer has noted, “[i]f Scientific Development 
suggests the dynamic element of Chinese substantive constitutionalism, the 
                                                                                                                           
of the broad masses of the people, shifted the emphasis on Jiang Zemin’s Three Represents from 
the first prong to the third prong, i.e., “the interests of the vast majority of the people.” Id. at 114; 
Backer, supra note 4, at 374–75. 
 84 See SHAMBAUGH, supra note 12, at 119. 
 85 See id. at 119–20; Sharon R. Wesoky, Harmony and Critique: Chinese Modernity, Harmo-
nious Society, and Contemporary Chinese Feminist Perspectives, in CHINA’S RISE TO POWER: 
CONCEPTIONS OF STATE GOVERNANCE 49, 51–59 (Joseph Tse-Hei Lee et al. eds., 2012). 
 86 CONST. COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA General Program para. 7 (2012). This lack of speci-
ficity may be due to the fact that it was drafted into the Constitution while Hu Jintao still had a full 
term ahead of him, as opposed to the namesake programs of his predecessors Deng, who had just 
passed away, and Jiang, who was relinquishing his remaining formal power. See supra note 78. 
 87 17th Party Report, supra note 83, at § III: Thoroughly Applying the Scientific Outlook on 
Development. 
 88 See HU ANGANG, CHINA IN 2020: A NEW TYPE OF SUPERPOWER 143–44 (2011). 
 89 See Backer, supra note 4, at 375–78. This too was building upon Jiang Zemin’s stated goal 
of creating a Xiaokang Society which aims for an essentially well-off middle-class oriented popu-
lous. See SHAMBAUGH, supra note 12, at 115. 
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equally potent notion of ‘Harmonious Society’ provides its object.”90 Hu 
Jintao explained the goal of a Socialist Harmonious Society in an important 
speech to the Central Party School on 19 February 2005, stating: 
In short, our Party has proposed building a Socialist Harmonious 
Society, both on a scientific summary of the experience of Chi-
na’s reform and opening up and modernization, but also in the 
new situation at home and abroad to improve the party’s ability to 
implement the Scientific Development Concept, to better promote 
China’s economic social development of strategic initiatives.91 
This formulation appeals to Chinese traditions while addressing (at 
least rhetorically) China’s massive social challenges. The semantics of the 
Socialist Harmonious Society begin to tie together modern CCP ideological 
development with China’s rich and ancient past.92 Chairman Hu strength-
ened this link by emphasizing the universal struggle of social harmony, as 
well as quoting prominent, classical Chinese scholars, saying, “A lot of 
thought about social harmony has been produced in the history of our coun-
try. For example, Confucius said, ‘and for you,’ Mozi proposed ‘universal 
love’ and ‘love the poor’ social programs, and Mencius depicted the ‘little 
children social status’. . . .”93 
The impetus for this initiative may have been a 1999 policy speech by 
Li Ruihuan, then President of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Congress and a long-time member of the Politburo of the Central Commit-
tee, who stated: 
More than 2,000 years of history have proven that the teachings 
of Confucianism can inspire us as means to resolve the problems 
confronting human societies. We must adopt towards these teach-
ings a scientific method and attitude—we must study them, sys-
tematise them, synthesise them, keep what is best and reject the 
rest . . . .94 
                                                                                                                           
 90 Backer, supra note 4, at 375 (emphasis added). 
 91 Hu’s Speech, supra note 10. 
 92 See SHAMBAUGH, supra note 12, at 115–19. The term “Harmonious Society” rings of Con-
fucian overtones, while “Socialist” reminds us that it is a uniquely modern program tied to the 
Communist experience and the regime’s focus on “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” See id. 
at 116. 
 93 Hu’s Speech, supra note 10. Modern scholars excited by references to Confucianism in 
contemporary Chinese political discourse claim that this trend began years sooner. See Sébastien 
Billioud, Confucianism, “Cultural Tradition,” and Official Discourse in China at the Start of the 
New Century, CHINA PERSPECTIVES, 2007/3, at 50, 52–53, available at chinaperspectives.revues.
org/pdf/2033 (last visited Mar. 26, 2014). 
 94 LI RUIHUAN, XUE ZHEXUE, YONG ZHEXUE (学哲学 用哲学) [STUDYING PHILOSOPHY, 
USING PHILOSOPHY], 681 (2006) (emphasis added). Li Ruihuan, Gu Mu, and Ye Xuanping all 
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This quote explains that China will not resemble a neo-Confucian State in 
the near future,95 but rather suggests that the Socialist Harmonious Society 
is the vehicle for what Li Ruihuan advised: beginning to merge modern 
China with its rich history by “cherry-picking” the useful elements.96 
More practically, the Socialist Harmonious Society plank of the Scien-
tific Development concept is meant to address China’s growing sense of 
social and economic injustice.97 Whereas the socioeconomic policies pur-
sued by Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin delivered tremendously positive 
results, modern China features staggering income disparity, and social strat-
ification. 98  This has prompted lamentation from Chinese observers that, 
“Our society has many contradictions and uncertain factors in it, such as 
huge gaps in income, increasingly serious problems facing rural areas, 
farmers and agriculture, the drainage of farmland, heavy pressure in the 
workplace and an incomplete social security system.”99 
Chairman Hu’s formative experiences in China’s deep interior likely 
gave him an important perspective on these growing problems,100 thereby 
inspiring his attempted domestic reforms under the banner of the Socialist 
Harmonious Society.101 Chairman Hu embraced and expanded his predeces-
sor’s 1999 initiative to “Open Up the West” (xibu da kaifa),102 which shifted 
                                                                                                                           
called for a re-evaluation of Confucianism. WILLY WO-LAP LAM, CHINESE POLITICS IN THE HU 
JINTAO ERA: NEW LEADERS, NEW CHALLENGES 280 (2007). 
 95 See LI RUIHUAN, supra note 94, at 681; see also Jiang Qing & Daniel A. Bell, Op-Ed, A 
Confucian Constitution for China, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2012, at A25 (arguing that the political 
future of China is far likelier to be determined by the longstanding Confucianism). 
 96 See LI RUIHUAN, supra note 94, at 97. 
 97 See SHAMBAUGH, supra note 12, at 115–19. 
 98  See Harmonious Society, CHINA DAILY (Sept. 29, 2007), http://english.people.com.cn/
90002/92169/92211/6274603.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2014). 
 99 Id. 
 100 See Hu Jintao, GOV.CN (Mar. 15, 2008), http://english.gov.cn/2008-03/15/content_922944.
htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2014). According to his official government biographical sketch, Hu Jintao 
was born in Anhui Province and attended Tsinghua University in Beijing, but served his early career 
in inland and impoverished Gansu and Guizhou Provinces as well as Tibet. Id. 
 101 See Hu’s Speech, supra note 10. Hu noted this in his policy speech, elaborating seven 
fundamental measures for building a Socialist Harmonious Society: (1) To reverse the trend of 
excessive financial concentration; (2) To continue to strengthen anti-corruption and anti-bribery 
efforts; (3) To improve the personal income tax system and strengthen tax enforcement efforts; (4) 
To narrow the economic gap between urban and rural areas and seek poverty reduction; (5) To 
promote urbanization and demographically expand employment; (6) To create a more dynamic 
and well-trained work force; and (7) To establish a universal “saving” society. See id. 
 102 Heike Holbig, The Emergence of the Campaign to Open Up the West: Ideological For-
mation, Central-Decision Making and the Role of the Provinces, 178 CHINA Q. 335, 354 (2004); 
see also Guowuyuan guanyu shishi xibu dakaifa ruogan zhengce cuoshi de tongzhi (国务院关于
实施西部大开发若干政策措施的通知) [Circular of the State Council Concerning Several Poli-
cies on Carrying out the Development of China’s Vast Western Regions] (promulgated by St. 
Council, Oct. 26, 2000, effective Jan. 1, 2001), GUOFA, Oct. 26, 2000, available at http://www.
asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/cotsccspocotdocvwr1122/. 
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the focus of national development to China’s poorer western regions for the 
first time since 1978.103 According to official statistics, the Gross Domestic 
Product of China’s west jumped four-fold at an annual average growth rate 
of 11.7 percent between 2000 and 2008, allowing more than 9.54 million 
residents to escape poverty.104 These successes are likely what led to the 
inclusion of the Socialist Harmonious Society in the CCP Constitution. The 
CCP Constitution now states: 
[The CCP] leads the people in building a harmonious socialist so-
ciety . . . the Party focuses its efforts on ensuring and improving 
the people’s well-being by solving the most specific problems of 
the utmost and immediate concern to the people, works to enable 
all the people to share in more fruits of development in a more 
equitable way, and strives to create a situation in which all people 
do their best, find their proper places in society and live together 
in harmony.105 
C. The “Peaceful Development” Strategy of Foreign Policy 
Chairman Hu’s administration introduced the concept of China’s 
“Peaceful Rise” (heping jueqi)—quickly revised to the less provocative 
“Peaceful Development” (heping fazhan)—to describe China’s modern for-
eign policy approach.106 Though much has been written on the meaning of 
this foreign policy framework, it has rarely been considered in the context 
of China’s dual constitutions, where there is ample room for both realist and 
liberal interpretations, as well as future development.107 
1. The Normative/Liberal Approach to “Peaceful Development” 
The modern statement of the Peaceful Development strategy began 
with Zheng Bijian’s diplomatic study tour of the United States in 2002.108 
                                                                                                                           
 103 Holbig, supra note 102, at 335, 340; Fan Jie, Western Development Policy: Changes, Ef-
fects and Evaluation, in DEVELOPING CHINA’S WEST: A CRITICAL, PATH TO BALANCED NATION-
AL DEVELOPMENT 79, 85–88 (Y.M. Yeung & Shen Jinfa eds., 2004); see Shiwu xibu kaifa zongti 
guihua (“十五”西部开发总体规划) [The Tenth Comprehensive Five-Year Plan for Development 
of the West] (promulgated by the Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n, and the W. Dev. Off. of the St. 
Council, July 10 2002), No. 259 (China), available at http://big5.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/
gongbao/content/2003/content_62545.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2014). 
 104 See Western Development Strategy, CHINA DAILY (Dec. 22, 2009), http://www.chinadaily.
com.cn/china/westdevelopment/2009-12/22/content_9215054.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2014). 
 105 CONST. COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA General Program para. 17 (2012). 
 106 See Bonnie S. Glaser & Evan S. Medeiros, The Changing Ecology of Foreign-Policy-
Making in China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of “Peaceful Rise,” 190 CHINA Q. 
291, 229–301 (2007). 
 107 See supra notes 6–16 and accompanying text. 
 108 See Glaser & Medeiros, supra note 106, at 293–94. 
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Henry Kissinger asserts that Zheng and Hu developed this term after the 
tour in an effort to characterize China as a responsible world leader, com-
mitted to internal domestic development and the prudent application of soft 
power abroad.109 This linkage of domestic economic development to for-
eign policy is consistent with the letter of the CCP Constitution, which 
states: 
The [CCP] adheres to an independent foreign policy of peace, fol-
lows the path of peaceful development and a win-win strategy of 
opening up, takes both the domestic and international situations 
into consideration, and vigorously develops relations with other 
countries in order to bring about a favorable international envi-
ronment for China’s reform, opening up and modernization.110 
In this section, the CCP Constitution explicitly links internal develop-
ment to foreign policy.111 Hu Jintao then linked Scientific Development, 
Socialist Harmonious Society, and Peaceful Development together in a 
speech in February 2005.112 Hu said, “our Party has proposed building a 
Socialist Harmonious Society . . . in the new situation at home and abroad, 
to improve the party’s ability to implement the Scientific Development Con-
cept.”113 Such statements would become a recurring theme for the remain-
der of the Hu administration. 114  On harmonious international relations, 
Chairman Hu said: 
From an international perspective, building a Socialist Harmoni-
ous Society is an inevitable requirement for us to grasp the com-
plex and volatile international situation. . . . Overall, [there now 
exist] rare opportunities and favorable conditions to the develop-
ment of China’s reform, and so long as we hold high the banners 
of peace, development, and cooperation, calmly observe and 
firmly grasp the international situation, and deal with internation-
al affairs initiatives, will be able to create a favorable strategic 
situation in our country in order to fight for a longer term and 
                                                                                                                           
 109 See HENRY KISSINGER, ON CHINA 499–503 (2011). 
 110 CONST. COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA General Program para. 22 (2012). 
 111 Id. 
 112 See Hu’s Speech, supra note 10. 
 113 Id. 
 114 See Hu Jintao, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Report at Eighteenth Party 
Congress (Nov. 17, 2012), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-
11/17/c_131981259_2.htm (“New progress has been made in China’s diplomacy . . . . We have 
promoted reform in global governance, enhanced world peace and development, secured more 
representation and a greater say for China in international affairs, and created favorable interna-
tional conditions for China’s reform and development.”). 
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more favorable international and surrounding environment for 
China’s modernization.115 
2. The Realist Approach to “Peaceful Development” 
The realist approach to “Peaceful Development” is that the Peaceful 
Development Strategy does not imply pacifism. Chinese leaders have used 
the Peaceful Development Strategy as a justification for enhancing the mili-
tary, claiming that a favorable strategic situation in foreign policy is critical 
for domestic development.116 In 2005, Hu stated: 
At the same time, we must be soberly aware that the world today 
is still far from being tranquil [and] the regional and international 
security situation is not optimistic. . . . In such a complex and 
volatile international situation, to mount a stronger response to 
external challenges and risks, we must do a good job domestical-
ly, maintaining national unity, ethnic unity, and social stability.117 
China unapologetically increased its police and military capabilities, and 
adopted a more assertive weapons procurement campaign during Hu’s ten-
ure, including such high-profile acquisitions as anti-satellite missiles, anti-
carrier missiles, and an aircraft carrier.118 The CCP Constitution honors the 
military’s ongoing role “in the socialist modernization drive”119 and Hu ap-
plauded China’s accelerated military build-up during his farewell address to 
the 18th Communist Party Congress in 2012, saying “Our endeavors to 
strengthen national defense aim to safeguard China’s sovereignty, security 
and territorial integrity and ensure its peaceful development.”120 
Even though the Peaceful Development Strategy includes a robust stra-
tegic outlook, it has its hawkish critics within China.121 There are early in-
                                                                                                                           
 115 Hu’s Speech, supra note 10. 
 116 See id. 
 117 Id. Critics of the Socialist Harmonious Society claim that it is a euphemism for increased 
domestic security intended to suppress dissenting opinion, or “no self-initiated disruptive attempts.” 
See Pin Ho & Wen Huang, Opinion, Hu Jintao: The Mysterious Man Behind China’s “Harmonious 
Society,” CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Apr. 15 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/
Opinion/2010/0415/Hu-Jintao-the-mysterious-man-behind-China-s-harmonious-society (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2014). 
 118 See Kathrin Hille, A Show of Force: Fears Are Growing over the Hold China’s Well-
Equipped Army Has over Foreign Policy, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
42b2bdba-e9d5-11e0-bb3e-00144feab49a.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2014). 
 119 CONST. COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA General Program para. 19 (2012). 
 120 Hu Jintao, supra note 114, at § IX: Accelerating the Modernization of National Defense 
and the Armed Forces. 
 121 See generally LIU MINGFU, ZHONGGUO MENG: HOU MEIGUO SHIDAI DE DAGUO SIWEI 
ZHANLUE DINGWEI (中国梦:后美国时代的大国思维与战略定位) [CHINA DREAM: THE GREAT 
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dications that Xi Jinping will name his own approach to substantive consti-
tutionalism “Chinese Dream” (Zhongguo Meng), after a book by Colonel 
Liu Ming Fu, a professor at the National Defense University in Beijing.122 
In the book, Liu asserts that Beijing should develop its military forces, in 
part to displace the global leadership of the United States.123 Henry Kissin-
ger notes that Liu’s views, though not necessarily commanding a majority, 
reflect “at least some portion of China’s institutional structure.”124 
Those Chinese hawks may have a louder voice in foreign policy within 
the Xi Jinping administration. In the first 100 days of the Xi Administration, 
Chinese troops allegedly entered disputed land between China and India,125 
two influential Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) scholars as-
serted a challenge to Japanese administration of the Ryukyu Islands on the 
basis of its historic tributary status,126 and Xi himself spoke of a “strong-
army dream.”127 Given the ultimate reach of the tributary system,128 and 
claims regarding the destinations of the legendary Ming Dynasty explorer 
Zheng He,129 the geographic scope of possible future claims is broad.130 
                                                                                                                           
POWER THINKING AND STRATEGIC POSITIONING OF CHINA IN THE POST-AMERICAN AGE] (2010) 
(supporting a more bellicose approach to Chinese policy). 
 122 Id. The title of the book translates to: “Chinese Dream: The Great Power Thinking and Stra-
tegic Positioning in the Post-American Age.” Id. See Robert Lawrence Kuhn, Op-ed, Xi Jinping’s 
Chinese Dream, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/global/xi-
jinpings-chinese-dream.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Mar. 26, 2014). 
 123 See generally LIU, supra note 121 (advancing a number of reasons why China should 
develop its military forces). 
 124 KISSINGER, supra note 109, at 505. 
 125 India and China ‘Pull Back Troops’ in Disputed Border Area, BBC (May 6, 2013), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-22423999; Xi Jinping Fast Facts, CNN (Mar. 26, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/04/world/asia/xi-jinping—-fast-facts/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2014). 
 126 Zhang Haipeng, “Maguan tiaoyue” Yu Diaoyudao Wenti (《马关条约》与钓鱼岛问题) 
[On the “Treaty of Shimonoseki” and the Diaoyu Islands Issue], XINHUA (May 8, 2013), http://
news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-05/08/c_115676174.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2014) [hereinaf-
ter CASS Report]. 
 127 Xi Jinping and the Chinese Dream, ECONOMIST (May 4, 2013), http://www.economist.
com/news/leaders/21577070-vision-chinas-new-president-should-serve-his-people-not-nationalist-
state-xi-jinping (last visited Mar. 26, 2014). 
 128 See J.K. Fairbank, Tributary Trade and China’s Relations with the West, 1 FAR E. Q. 129, 
136 (1942). 
 129 See GAVIN MENZIES, 1421: THE YEAR CHINA DISCOVERED AMERICA 74–75 (2008). The 
most controversial statement of Zheng’s reach was made by Gavin Menzies, who claims that 
Zheng He’s expeditions colonized the Americas. See id. at 405–06. 
 130 See Ilona Raskolnikova, China Has Territorial Claims to Nearly 20 Countries PRAVDA 
(July 17, 2012), http://english.pravda.ru/world/asia/17-07-2012/121658-china_territorial_claims-
0/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2014). 
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3. Balancing the Views Under Hu Jintao 
Hu always sought to assuage acute fears about China’s increasing ca-
pacity for belligerence by repeatedly emphasizing the peaceful development 
overtone.131 The PRC government conducted a media blitz in late 2005 to 
emphasize its focus on peaceful development.132 As part of this media blitz, 
Hu proposed the development of a “harmonious world” at 60th anniversary 
summit for United Nations establishment in September;133 Zheng published 
a piece for Foreign Affairs in October;134 and the PRC released a white pa-
per entitled “China’s Peaceful Development Road” in December, announc-
ing that China would “persist unswervingly in taking the road of peaceful 
development.”135 Hu’s government would repeat these promises many more 
times, including his final report to the 18th Party Congress in 2012.136 In 
expressing the seamlessness between China’s internal and external policies 
one last time, Hu explained: 
China will continue to keep in mind both the interests of the Chi-
nese people and the common interests of the people of all coun-
tries, get more actively involved in international affairs, play its 
due role of a major responsible country, and work jointly with 
other countries to meet global challenges.137 
Professor Hu Angang offers the most eloquent scholarly summation of 
the Peaceful Development nexus yet, writing: 
China’s rise has been defined by peaceful development. Through-
out this process, China and the international community have 
                                                                                                                           
 131 Hu delivered several speeches in 2005 alone asserting peaceful development. See, e.g., Hu 
Jintao, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Speech to G20: Strengthening Global Coopera-
tion to Promote Common Development (Oct. 15, 2005), available at http://english.gov.cn/2005-
10/16/content_78589.htm [hereinafter G20 Speech]; Hu Jintao Delivers an Important Speech at the 
UN Summit, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF CHINA (Sept. 16, 2005), http://www.china-
un.org/eng/zt/shnh60/t212614.htm [hereinafter UN Speech]. Hu gave a speech entitled, “Making 
Great Efforts to Build a Harmonious World with Long-lasting Peace and Common Prosperity.” See 
UN Speech, supra; see also Hu Jintao, supra note 114 (repeating the common theme of peaceful 
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 132 See, e.g., G20 Speech, supra note 131; UN Speech, supra note 131; Zheng Bijian, China’s 
Peaceful Rise to Great Power Status, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 18, 19–24 (2005) (discussing China’s 
strategic plans to develop peacefully). 
 133 See UN Speech, supra note 131. 
 134 See Zheng, supra note, 132 at 18. 
 135 State Council Info. Office, China’s Peaceful Development Road (2005) [hereinafter Peace-
ful Development White Paper], available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Dec/152669.
htm. 
 136 See Hu Jintao, supra note 114, at § XI: Continuing to Promote the Noble Cause of Peace 
and Development of Mankind. 
 137 Id. 
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been mutually dependent. For this reason, China must consider 
both the interests of the world and its own interests. Thus that 
which conforms to the interests of China today tends to be condu-
cive to promoting the interests of the world as a whole. This is 
why China advocates for a unity of nationalism and globalism ra-
ther than putting nationalism above globalism.138 
This nexus between the Scientific Development Outlook, Socialist Harmo-
nious Society, and Peaceful Development is the most advanced manifesta-
tion of Chinese communist thought, and its message resonates in much of 
the developing world.139 Whether China will choose to resist the temptation 
of using coercive power to achieve its developmental goals is an open ques-
tion, but the decisions of the Hu Jintao administration indicate that China 
will cautiously, but confidently defend its interests on the world stage, with-
in the limits of its normative constitutionalism. 
III. APPLYING THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN POLICY UNDER  
HU JINTAO: SUCCESSES AND ONGOING GOALS 
This section explains how the Chinese dual constitutions provide spe-
cific normative guidance to China’s foreign policy decision-makers, thereby 
informing the practice of Chinese diplomacy. The section notes several ex-
amples that demonstrate how the Chinese dual constitutions applied to some 
of the most pressing international events with which the Hu Administration 
dealt.140 These examples show that the foreign policy of “Peaceful Devel-
opment” can be understood in the context of the Chinese constitutional law 
of foreign affairs. They also identify and explore two unresolved but related 
normative questions that emerged during Hu’s tenure: [1] what is the scope 
of Chinese irredentism; and [2] will China be able to maintain its claim as 
the moral leader of the developing world, even as it achieves its own devel-
opment goals? 
A. Case Studies in Unification and Irredentism 
The first normative question about Chinese foreign policy is how far 
its irredentist claims extend. By invoking irredentism, China seeks to re-
move territorial disputes from the arena of foreign policy constitutionalism 
                                                                                                                           
 138 HU ANGANG, supra note 88, at 15 (emphasis added). 
 139 See CONST. COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA General Program (2012); Hu Jintao, supra note 
114. Even before this linkage was made explicit, the extraterritorial appeal of Chinese policy was 
growing. See JOSHUA COOPER RAMO, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS 3 (2004). 
 140 Unfortunately there is not enough length available to discuss all issues. Some, such as the 
evolving Chinese perception of the “Duty to Protect” in International Law (vis-à-vis situations in 
Libya and Syria), are reserved for later comment. 
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(where the Five Principles would apply), and instead consider these dis-
putes under the constitutional clauses on national reunification, or the rheto-
ric of “core interests.”141 By considering territorial disputes under irreden-
tism and not foreign policy, China need not follow the “Peaceful Develop-
ment” policy. 
1. China’s Use of Irredentism in Taiwan 
The PRC and the Guomindang (GMD) political party of Taiwan both 
agree that there is only “One China”142 and that Taiwan is an indisputable 
part of it.143 Nonetheless, when Hu entered office in 2002, Taiwanese oppo-
sition President Chen Shui-bian asserted that Taiwan is a sovereign and in-
dependent State, reframing the situation and creating a security crisis for 
Beijing. 144 Hu responded in part by offering to consider “international liv-
ing space”145 for Taiwan, a stance some considered “soft.”146 Chen respond-
ed by offering to negotiate “on the basis of the 1992 meeting in Hong 
Kong.”147 His choice of words intentionally demeaned the 1992 Consensus, 
an agreement between PRC and GMD leaders that re-acknowledged the 
                                                                                                                           
 141 Joint Statement, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, U.S.–China Joint Statement (Nov. 
17, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-china-joint-statement (dis-
cussing Taiwan and territorial integrity). See generally WU XINBO, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, CHINA 
AND THE UNITED STATES: CORE INTERESTS, COMMON INTERESTS, AND PARTNERSHIP (2011) 
(discussing China–U.S. relations and China’s interests in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang). 
 142 U.S.–China Joint Statement, supra note 141. 
 143 See id. (acknowledging China’s One China policy regarding Taiwan); Interview with Chen 
Shui-bian, President, Taiwan (Mar. 30, 2004), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/
3582853.stm (last visited Mar. 26, 2014); Taiwan Affairs Office Issues Statement on Current 
Cross-Straits Relations, EMBASSY OF CHINA IN THE U.S. (May 17, 2004), http://www.china-
embassy.org/eng/zt/twwt/t111117.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2014) [hereinafter Cross-Straits Rela-
tions] (“[T]here is only one China in the world and both the mainland and Taiwan belong to that 
one and same China, abandon the ‘Taiwan Independence’ stance and stop the separatist activities, 
then, cross-Straits relations can hold out a bright prospect of peace, stability and development 
. . . .”). 
 144 See Interview with Chen Shui-bian, supra note 143 (“Taiwan is an independent sovereign 
country. Under the current constitution its name is the Republic of China. In the 1999 resolution 
regarding Taiwan’s future . . . it is stated very clearly that any change to the status quo of Taiwan 
must be decided by the people of Taiwan through referenda.”). Chen served as President of the 
Republic of China from 2000 to 2008, leading of the Democratic Progressive Party, the strongest 
faction in the Taiwanese Pan-Green Coalition. See Profile: Chen Shui-bian, BBC (June 11, 2010), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2172980.stm (last visited Mar. 26, 2014). 
 145 Cross-Straits Relations, supra note 143. 
 146 Cheng-yi Lin & Wen-cheng Lin, A Rising China and Hu Jintao’s Taiwan Policy, in RISE 
OF CHINA: BEIJING’S STRATEGIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC 284, 296–97 (2009) 
(discussing Hu Jintao’s series of soft policies toward Taiwan); Cross-Straits Relations, supra note 
143. 
 147  Chen Shui-bian’s Call for Talks Discredited, XINHUA (Oct. 11, 2004), http://news.
xinhuanet.com/english/2004-10/11/content_2074975.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2014). 
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One China principle.148 This statement struck Beijing as a provocative effort 
to repudiate the One China principle.149 
China immediately changed course, abandoning its “soft” stance for a 
decidedly more aggressive one. The NPC passed an Anti-Secession Law in 
March 2005, threatening to use non-peaceful means in response to a Tai-
wanese declaration of independence.150 Most intriguingly, the CCP used its 
united front strategy to bypass Chen’s government, and speak directly with 
the GMD opposition.151 In April 2005, Chairman Hu initiated an unprece-
dented meeting—the first since the end of World War II—with GMD 
chairman Lien Chan.152 These tactics undermined Chen’s government, evi-
denced by the effect on the Taiwanese electorate in the next election.153 
In 2008, GMD leader Ma Ying-jeou won the Taiwanese presidency 
and a majority in the Legislative Yuan.154 This change in the leadership of 
Taiwan immediately thawed relations between China and Taiwan, so much 
so that the two nations agreed to negotiate under the 1992 Consensus. Soon 
thereafter, China and Taiwan announced the China-Taiwan Economic Co-
operation Framework Agreement of 2010.155 
                                                                                                                           
 148 See Backgrounder: The 1992 Consensus on One-China Principle, PEOPLE’S DAILY (Oct. 
13, 2004), http://english.people.com.cn/200410/13/eng20041013_160081.html (last visited Mar. 
26, 2014); Chen Shui-bian’s Call for Talks Discredited, supra note 147. 
 149 See Chen Shui-bian’s Call for Talks Discredited, supra note 147. 
 150 See Fanfen lieguo jiafa (反分裂国家法) [Anti-Secession Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 2005, effective Mar. 14, 2005) (Lawinfochina) at art. 8 (China) available at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=3970&lib=law&SearchKeyword=anti-succession%20
law&SearchCKeyword=. 
 151 Cheng-yi Lin & Wen-cheng Lin, supra note 146, at 296. 
 152 Text of KMT-Beijing Agreement, BBC (Apr. 29, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/4498791.stm (last visited Mar. 26, 2014). 
 153 See Ken Liberthal, President, John L. Thornton China Ctr., Panel Discussion at the U.S. Inst. 
of Peace & the Richard Nixon Found., Symposium on China’s Domestic Evolution: From Mao 
Zedong to Deng Xiaoping to the 21st Century (Mar. 7, 2012) [hereinafter China’s Domestic Evolu-
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Evolution.pdf. Ken Lieberthal stated, “[O]n Taiwan I would give Hu even more credit than Susan 
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 154 See Edward Cody, Taiwan Voters Elect New President, WASH. POST (Mar. 23, 2008), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/22/AR2008032200442.html (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2014). 
 155 Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, Taiwan–China, June 29, 2010, 
available at http://www.moea.gov.tw/Mns/populace/news/wHandNews_File.ashx?news_id=19723&
serial_no=6. 
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2. Chinese Claims in the South China Sea 
China has also used irredentism to claim territory in the South China 
Sea.156 The South China Sea contains many disparate island chains and cor-
al reefs and a seabed that is believed to be rich in oil and natural gas.157 Alt-
hough there have been several longstanding disputes about sovereignty in 
the South China Sea, the competition to claim parts of the Sea greatly inten-
sified during the 1990s.158 Chinese military forces established themselves 
on an increasing number of islands159 and Chinese naval vessels increased 
the number of patrols on the waters.160 The U.S. Navy reported that one of 
its ships—the USNS Impeccable—was harassed by Chinese ships in the 
South China Sea in 2009, and India claimed that one of its ships was har-
assed in July 2011.161 Partially in response to increased activity in the South 
China Sea, the United States has reinvested in regional diplomacy in the 
area, under its “pivot to Asia.”162 
Some observers are concerned that China is pursuing dominance in the 
region, claiming the vast majority of the South China Sea for itself under its 
formulation of the “Nine–Dash Line.” The “Nine–Dash Line” is a line of de-
marcation that sets out China’s claims in the South China Sea. The line nearly 
                                                                                                                           
 156 Zhonghua Remmin Gongheguo Linghai Jipi Lianoufa (中华人民共和国领海及毗连区法) 
[Law of the PRC on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zones] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 25, 1992, effective Feb. 25, 1992) Order No. 55 of the 
President of China [hereinafter Territorial Sea Law], available at http://english.chinamil.com.cn/
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China’s South China Sea Claims, WORLD AFF., May-June 2013, at 83, 88–90. 
 157 See Zou Le, Oil Bonanza in the South China Sea, GLOBAL TIMES (China) (Apr. 19, 2011), 
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Territorial Sea Law apparently transferred the region into its constitutional irredentism discourse. See 
id.; Territorial Sea Law, supra note 156. Thereafter, in 1995, China occupied the Meiji Reef, for 
which the Philippines had a rival claim. See China Cannot Tolerate Philippines’ Occupation of Reef, 
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htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2014). 
 159 See Kane, supra note 4, at 309–10. Including a 1988 skirmish with Vietnamese forces over 
the Spratley Islands. See id. 
 160 See Navy Enters South China Sea for Patrol, Training, XINHUA, (Feb 1, 2013), http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-02/01/c_132144770.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2014). 
 161 India-China Face-off in South China Sea, DNA India (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.dnaindia.
com/india/report_india-china-face-off-in-south-china-sea-report_1582481 (last visited Mar. 26, 2014); 
Pentagon Says Chinese Vessels Harassed U.S. Ship, CNN (Mar. 9, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/
2009-03-09/politics/us.navy.china_1_chinese-ships-chinese-vessels-chinese-media?_s=PM:POLITICS 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2014). 
 162 Keith B. Rickburg, U.S. Pivot to Asia Makes China Nervous, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/us-pivot-to-asia-makes-china-nervous/2011/11/
15/gIQAsQpVRN_story.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2014). 
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encircles the entire South China Sea, and thus encroaches upon the competing 
claims of the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, and Taiwan.163 After 
encountering fierce resistance to its claims under the Nine–Dash Line, China 
agreed to submit to multilateral negotiations with the States that had compet-
ing claims.164 Critics were suspicious of China’s willingness to partake in 
multilateral negotiations, claiming that China’s embrace of multilateralism is 
intended only to provide a stage for airing its goals.165 
In January 2013, several months after a standoff with China over the 
Scarborough Shoal, the Philippines brought an action against China in a 
binding arbitration tribunal organized under the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, which both nations have ratified.166 Although the 
tribunal does not have jurisdiction to settle boundary disputes outright, the 
Philippine complaint was carefully worded to grant the tribunal jurisdiction 
in this case, by stressing China’s alleged interference with the lawful exer-
cise of rights within the legitimate maritime zones of the Philippines (i.e., 
the recognized 200-mile-from-shore exclusive economic zone).167 The Chi-
nese did not make a timely response to the complaint and though they may 
respond at a later date, a ruling may be made in abstentia.168 At the time of 
this writing, China was also involved in territorial skirmishes over the Di-
aoyu (Sensaku) Islands with Japan, and a stretch of the Himalayan Moun-
tains with India, both of which China considers its own national territory.169 
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 165 See id. at 50. 
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 169 See China Alert to Japanese Diaoyu Islands Escalation, XINHUA (Jan. 16, 2013), http://news.
xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-01/16/c_132107163.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2014); India and 
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3. Constitutional Instruction on Irredentism 
As shown in these examples, China has used irredentism to effectively 
remove territorial disputes from the arena of foreign policy constitutional-
ism—where the Five Principles would theoretically apply—and transfer 
these disputes to the purview of the constitutional clauses on national reuni-
fication and defense of the motherland.170 Once these territorial disputes 
have been taken out of the realm of foreign policy constitutionalism, it 
seems that China will treat them as core interests.171 
Regarding Taiwan, the CCP and GMD agree that the One China policy 
will one day result in reconciliation.172 Though the Hu administration ap-
plied pressure to generate the Taiwanese election result that the CCP and 
GMD desired, the Chinese dual constitutions are clear on the status of Tai-
wan.173 The Preamble of the State Constitution avers: 
Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People’s Republic of 
China. It is the inviolable duty of all Chinese people, including 
our compatriots in Taiwan, to accomplish the great task of reuni-
fying the motherland. . . . [T]here has been formed under the 
leadership of the Communist Party of China a broad patriotic 
united front, which is composed of . . . all patriots who stand for 
the reunification of the motherland. This united front will contin-
ue to be consolidated and developed.174 
The CCP Constitution also contains the application of this United 
Front to Taiwan.175 It states: 
The [CCP] rallies all [into] the broadest possible patriotic united 
front embracing all . . . who support the reunification of the 
motherland. The Party will constantly strengthen the unity of all 
the Chinese people, including the compatriots in Hong Kong and 
Macao special administrative regions and in Taiwan as well as 
overseas Chinese.176 
                                                                                                                           
 170 See XIANFA pmbl., arts. 24, 29, 54, 55 (2004); supra Part III(a)(1)–(2). 
 171 See WU, supra note 141, at 2–3. See Territorial Sea Law, supra note 156, arts. 1–3. 
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Although it influenced Taiwan’s election, Beijing did not violate any of its 
constitutional rules on mutual respect or non-interference because both con-
stitutions regard relations with Taiwan as a domestic situation.177 As to the 
more opaque mechanics of jurisdictional constitutionalism, Dr. Susan Shirk 
told a conference panel that Hu was particularly active in Taiwan policy, 
stating: 
[Hu] really tried to reach out and take a different approach to 
Taiwan, especially after Ma Ying-jeou’s election . . . It’s very in-
teresting that he’s protected Taiwan policy from the trends to-
wards a, kind of, more provocative Chinese foreign policy in oth-
er areas. But Taiwan policy has been protected by Hu, and, you 
know, that’s been quite a good thing. . . . I’d say maybe that’s his 
most positive legacy. 178 
The situation in Taiwan is relevant to the situation in the South China 
Sea and beyond, because China will seek to absorb any Taiwanese claims 
over the territory in these areas, just as it sought to absorb the GMD’s 
claims to sovereignty over Tibet and Xinjiang.179 Thus, China and Taiwan 
are likely to agree in principle on any claims to both the South China Sea, 
and the Diaoyu islands. 
4. Constitutional Instruction on Reunification 
Once China has used irredentism to take a dispute from the foreign 
policy arena and place it under the domestic constitutional clauses, it uses 
the principle of reunification to justify its claims. The State Constitution 
refers to reunification three times in the Preamble (just as many times as it 
refers to the leadership of the CCP).180 Article 29 refers to the duty of every 
citizen to defend the motherland181 and “participate in national reconstruc-
tion.”182 But the territorial scope of such historicist claims is not unlimited. 
                                                                                                                           
 177 See XIANFA pmbl. paras. 9–10 (2004); CONST. COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA General 
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Recalling the Socialist Harmonious Society’s historical undertones, 
one should reconsider China’s ancient foreign policy tradition.183 Chinese 
domestic and foreign affairs long operated under a worldview known as 
Tianxia, literally translating to “Under Heaven.”184 According to this view, 
China’s Imperial Court was the center of a world that extended outward to 
Chinese citizens and, finally, foreign “barbarians.”185 This view of the order 
of social relations was reinforced by the tributary system of international 
relations, which required nations that wanted to trade with China to demon-
strate China’s superior status by sending “tribute” missions before trading 
could begin.186 In exchange for their careful performance of subjugating 
rituals, the barbarian nationalities were allowed to trade at China’s ports.187 
With increasing economic and military power at its command, it is not 
difficult to imagine that China’s foreign policy establishment could be tempt-
ed to reinstate modes of regional hegemony that resembles a de facto Tianxia 
order.188 Indeed, there has been renewed academic interest in the Tianxia sys-
tem.189 Members of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) have 
argued for world government based on the Tianxia system.190 Additionally, 
other scholars have asserted that the United States currently manages “the 
most successful tributary system the world has ever seen.” 191 In October 
2011, an editorial in the Global Times threatened, “If these [Southeast Asian] 
countries don’t want to change their ways with China, they will need to pre-
pare for the sounds of cannons,” 192  demonstrating a modern Tianxia 
worldview.193 After the editorial, China appeared to back off, with a Chinese 
Foreign Ministry spokeswoman reconfirming China’s dedication “to resolv-
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ing the dispute through peaceful means.”194 Despite this reassuring message 
afterwards, the assertive approach of the editorial aroused alarm in those na-
tions with competing claims to the South China Sea, and allowed the United 
States to organize China’s aggrieved neighbors—including the former pariah 
state of Myanmar—into a concerted negotiating group.195 China’s decision 
not to participate in the binding arbitration procedure proposed by the Philip-
pines, though reasonable from a realist perspective, may also further swing 
international opinion against Beijing. 
Whether China’s impulse to use force to get what it wants is philo-
sophically derivative of Tianxia, Realpolitik, or “big-nation chauvinism”196 
may reveal the extent of future Chinese claims, especially in light of the 
recent challenge to Japanese administration of the Ryukyu Islands on the 
basis of their historic tributary status.197 China has demonstrated that it will 
not acquiesce to the adverse possession of Chinese territory, through its per-
sistent claims throughout the present era.198 In the future, when the interna-
tional conditions are ripe, China may attempt a similar strategy of invoking 
constitutional irredentism to reclaim lands once belonging to China, but 
now under Indian, Japanese, or Russian administration.199 At present, Chi-
na’s developing neighbors to the south see this assertion in the South China 
Sea as a challenge to their sovereignty, and may change their perception of 
China as protector of the developing world. 
B. Case Studies in Sovereignty and Non-Interference 
Even where China does not assert any irredentist claims, Chinese for-
eign policy is still done for the purpose of “bring[ing] about a favorable inter-
national environment for China’s reform, opening up and modernization.”200 
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This purpose of Chinese foreign policy is clear, even if one considers other 
constitutional provisions that claim that China “consistently opposes imperi-
alism, hegemonism and colonialism,”201 and seeks “good neighborly relations 
between China and the surrounding countries.” 202  Decades of substantive 
constitutionalism stressing national development support the idea that the 
focus of Chinese foreign policy has always been the development of China’s 
domestic economy.203 Although it seems Hu Jintao sensed that China should 
attempt to reconcile these goals, his work remains unfinished. 
1. International Environmentalism and the 2009 UN Copenhagen Climate 
Conference 
China’s tenuous claim to its traditional role as a champion of the de-
veloping world was evident at the Copenhagen Climate Conference in De-
cember 2009.204 The conference highlighted the growing divide between 
China’s constitutional insistence upon sovereignty and non-interference, 
and the aspirations of the developing world.205 The attendees failed to create 
a legally binding plan to abate global warming despite years of advance 
diplomacy, 206 and only managed to agree to a three-page accord. 207 The 
conference’s most important precedential contribution was to codify the 
responsibility of individual nations to act on their own to address global 
warming, including China in this responsibility for the first time.208 This 
new responsibility, however, will likely mean nothing, because the parties 
did not establish any international surveillance practices—as China had in-
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sisted.209 Indeed, just as the international community saw the United States 
as the major obstacle to crafting a meaningful outcome at Kyoto, it saw 
China as a major obstacle to any agreement at Copenhagen.210 But in Kyo-
to, the developing nations allowed the United States to demand different 
standards, resulting in an agreement with no teeth, whereas in Copenhagen, 
the developing nations refused to give China—another world leader—any 
special consideration, resulting in the lack of any agreement at all.211 In 
2009, Lin Feng and I observed: 
Whereas the environmental law principle of ‘common but differen-
tiated responsibilities’ was absolutely paramount in the Kyoto re-
gime, the inclusion of responsibilities for the largest developing 
countries [at the Copenhagen Conference] incorporates the ‘pollut-
er pays’ principle, which is favored by the developed world. In-
deed, nations that arrived divided between North and South, devel-
oped and developing, and rich and poor, left frustrated by the rela-
tively inflexible attitudes of the United States and China.212 
It is likely that the world’s small-scale developing nations are realign-
ing, to pressure the world’s largest overall greenhouse gas emitters into 
greater concessions.213 For example, Maldives President Mohamed Nasheed 
seemed to question China’s future leadership of the G77 group of develop-
ing nations, saying, “It is very difficult to maintain a political grouping that 
was formed with a whole lot of ideology that has become obsolete . . . 
There are many big developing countries that do not need an agreement. 
They would rather go with business as usual.”214 Although both the United 
States and China managed to preserve their bottom lines at Copenhagen, 
future negotiations may challenge their power regarding global govern-
ance.215 If the developing world does realign to counterbalance China’s self-
interest, it will have serious implications for China’s soft power diplomacy. 
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2. Financial Globalization, the Developing World Multilateral Offensive, 
and African Investments 
China has the luxury of expanding its international economic portfolio 
in an era of Western austerity.216 The most significant symbol of this was the 
establishment of China’s largest sovereign wealth fund—the Chinese Invest-
ment Corporation (CIC)—in 2007, just as western economies were spiraling 
into financial crisis.217 Though China is deficient in critical natural resources, 
its State-owned enterprises are spending billions of dollars to secure access to 
foreign deposits of natural resources, an approach that has concerned many 
other nations.218 Although China’s investment outlook in Western markets has 
improved considerably over the past five years, China has had greater success 
investing in the developing world, particularly Africa.219 
More quietly, the Hu administration sought to create different forums 
for economic engagement.220 In Latin America, China created new multilat-
eral consultation mechanisms with the Andean Community, the Rio Group, 
and the South American trading bloc MERCOSUR.221 In 2004, China sent a 
police contingent to Haiti, and also created the China-Caribbean Economy 
and Trade Cooperation Forum.222 That same year, it established the China-
Arab Nations Cooperation Forum.223 
Although China has made great strides to promote development in the 
Americas, the “flagship for China’s multilateral diplomacy toward the de-
veloping world”224 is the China-Africa Cooperation Forum.225 This project, 
which began under Jiang Zemin, has grown into a “summit meeting of Chi-
nese and African leaders” which met in November 2006, with delegates of 
forty-eight African countries travelling to Beijing to discuss a new brand of 
strategic partnership.226 
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Many Western commentators have lauded the Chinese initiatives, es-
pecially toward Africa.227 In 2007, members of the Council on Foreign Re-
lations praised Chinese investments both for their focus on infrastructure 
improvements and their relative transparency.228 The Associate Direction of 
the Sustainable Development Solutions Network similarly commended 
China for its strong track record regarding the cancellation of African debt 
and because Chinese aid is both largely non-conditional and more quickly 
deliverable than Western aid.229 
Controversially, China has “targeted resource-rich African nations such 
as Sudan and Angola for energy-related development.”230 This led some 
African leaders to add their voices to a small, but growing, chorus of dissat-
isfaction with Chinese investment.231 For example, one critic has asserted in 
2007 that, “one has to be naïve to believe that the sudden interest of China 
is out of philanthropy.”232 More recently, the governor of Nigeria’s central 
bank, Lamido Sanusi, wrote a 2013 Financial Times editorial, in which he 
claimed that China’s approach to Africa is as exploitative as any form of 
Western imperialism, because the Chinese extract natural resources without 
transferring valuable skills to the local workforce.233 He wrote, “The days 
of the Non-Aligned Movement that united us after colonialism are gone. 
China is no longer a fellow under-developed economy—it is the world’s 
second-biggest, capable of the same forms of exploitation as the west. It is a 
significant contributor to Africa’s deindustrialisation and underdevelop-
ment.”234 
These examples underscore the potential for disharmony between Chi-
na’s pursuit of national development goals and the expectations of the de-
veloping world. 
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3. Constitutional Instruction on China’s Relations with the Developing 
World 
China’s traditional alignment with the developing world has long been 
a source of pride for the nation, and is also enshrined in its State Constitu-
tion, which states: 
China consistently opposes imperialism, hegemonism and coloni-
alism, works to strengthen unity with the people of other coun-
tries, supports the oppressed nations and the developing countries 
in their just struggle to win and preserve national independence 
and develop their national economies.235 
Indeed, China’s status as the only developing country member of the U.N. 
Security Council has provided it with many opportunities to speak out on 
behalf of developing countries.236 But, the union between Chinese interests 
and the interests of the developing world may be weakening, as evidenced 
by China’s refusal to accept international monitoring standards.237 Though 
China’s refusal is in keeping with its constitutional “Five Principles” insist-
ence upon sovereignty and mutual non-interference,238 it is contrary to the 
expectations of much of the developing world.239 
Furthermore, the dual constitutions highlight the paramount role of 
economic and industrial development in modernizing the nation. 240  The 
State Constitution proclaims that “Major successes have been achieved in 
economic development. An independent and fairly comprehensive socialist 
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system of industry has in the main been established.”241 Meanwhile, the 
CCP Constitution says: 
The [CCP] leads the people in developing the socialist market 
economy. It unwaveringly consolidates and develops the public 
sector of the economy and unswervingly encourages, supports 
and guides the development of the non-public sector. It gives play 
to the basic role of market forces in allocating resources and 
works to set up a sound system of macroeconomic regulation.242 
Deng Xiaoping Theory and the Three Represents helped to facilitate 
China’s meteoric shift from an agrarian to an industrial power.243 The theo-
ries of Scientific Development and the Socialist Harmonious Society con-
tinue to push for China’s economic development, but seek to distribute eco-
nomic prosperity more evenly across the populace.244 Even the foreign poli-
cy of Peaceful Development focuses on foreign policy as a means to aid 
China’s economic development.245 From these examples, one can see that 
there is no constitutional motivation to put the brakes on industry or in-
vestment. 
Although the constitutions maintain a focus on economic development, 
in 2010, the CCP Constitution also added a section promoting ecological 
progress. 246  The relevant provision reads, “The Party must promote all-
around economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological progress in ac-
cordance with the overall plan for the cause of socialism with Chinese char-
acteristics.”247 The General Program of the CCP Constitution goes on to say 
that the CCP “leads the people in promoting socialist ecological progress 
. . . aimed at creating a good working and living environment for the people 
and ensuring lasting and sustainable development of the Chinese nation.”248 
The qualifying language of “progress in accordance with the overall plan 
for the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics,”249 and placing eco-
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logical progress at the end of list, however, subjugates environmental con-
cerns to economic ones.250 Thus, for the time being, China’s leaders have a 
distinct constitutional mandate to place the national economic interest clear-
ly ahead of environmental diplomacy. With that in mind, China should be 
lauded for its considerable investment in developing a greener economy 
under Hu Jintao.251 
Meanwhile, although at first glance China’s venture socialism would 
seem to be opposed to the State Constitution’s admonition against the “dec-
adent” ideas of capitalism,252 this admonition must be read in the light of 
the Three Represents constitutionalism. 253  That reading dictates that the 
CCP must: [1] represent the advanced productive forces in society; [2] rep-
resent the advanced modern culture; and [3] represent the interests of the 
vast majority of the people.254 Indeed, once the 1982 Constitution declared 
that the historical “exploiting classes as a class have been eliminated in our 
country,”255 China was free to begin interfacing with global economic insti-
tutions as part of its reform and opening up, in order to build an advanced 
socialist society.256 This unleashed a torrent of Chinese industriousness, re-
sulting in the anointing of an elite professional class. 257  Whereas Deng 
Xiaoping Theory unleashed these “Red Capitalists,”258 the Three Represents 
allowed them to become CCP members.259 The challenge for Scientific De-
velopment is to redirect capitalism in a way that it can benefit the vast ma-
jority of the people, as opposed to just the small class of elites. 
China’s primary foreign policy challenge will be securing the immense 
amount of resources it needs to complete its development while maintaining 
harmonious relations with the developing world.260 One can speculate on 
the amount of leverage the CCP will have with the governments and corpo-
rations that it seeks to invest in, but Beijing believes that its model of so-
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cialism provides an example for other nations to follow.261 The flow of capi-
tal from this more altruistic China could someday echo the “conditional 
aid” packages of Western countries, where aid to developing countries is 
tied to policy conditions.262 China will emphasize the advantages of adopt-
ing those policies as reflected in its own domestic constitutionalism. 
CONCLUSION 
A new generation of Chinese leaders took over in early 2013, when 
Chairman Hu passed the reins of power to his successor, Xi Jinping. Alt-
hough each CCP administration’s constitutional platform is refined into its 
successors to form an uninterrupted iteration of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, it is unclear exactly what will become of the nexus between 
the theories of Scientific Development, the Socialist Harmonious Society, 
and Peaceful Development under the Xi Jinping administration. The rhetor-
ical focus has already shifted to the “Chinese Dream” (Zhongguo Meng). If 
and when China achieves superpower status, it will be in large part due to 
the success of its internal policies, which it is now attempting to project into 
the practice of foreign affairs. This seamless expression of national and in-
ternational policy is a product of the proper application of the CCP’s gov-
erning ideology as refined from the time of Mao Zedong up to and includ-
ing its expression as Scientific Development. 
Under the theory of realpolitik, one can predict that as China’s domes-
tic wealth and military strength continue to increase, Chinese leaders will 
face greater internal pressure to use those resources to press for national 
interests. The first year of the Xi administration suggests an early willing-
ness to do so with more confidence. Although it does appear that China is 
risking some of its soft power in the developing world, from the perspective 
of Copenhagen and the South China Sea, it is gaining an attractive portfolio 
of territorial and economic interests. Hu’s China counterbalanced the effects 
of its resource acquisitions by increasing foreign aid. Although there is 
room for both policy goals under China’s constitutional law of foreign poli-
cy, China’s primary challenge will be securing the vast amount of resources 
it needs to complete its development while maintaining harmonious rela-
tions with the developing world. The normative argument could be made 
that in order to remain constitutional, China’s attempts at policy seamless-
ness should eschew the competitive temptations at the heart of big nation 
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chauvinism, but China’s constitutional development leaves ample room for 
both realist and liberal interpretations. 
The possibility of a foreign affairs crisis resulting in a major constitu-
tional controversy is low because the Chinese constitutional law of foreign 
affairs is fairly explicit. As the specific examples of foreign policy conduct 
during the Hu administration analyzed herein demonstrate, the practice of 
Chinese foreign policy is informed by the nation’s dual constitution system. 
China’s foreign affairs are not only procedurally ordered by, but also sub-
stantively instructed by, express provisions of the State and Communist Par-
ty Constitutions, and this feature is worthy of more study. After all, as the 
Chinese state constitution says, “China’s achievements in revolution and 
construction are inseparable from support by the people of the world. The 
future of China is closely linked with that of the whole world,”263 while one 
of its leading minds asserts, “that which conforms to the interests of China 
today tends to be conducive to promoting the interests of the world as a 
whole.”264 As the constitutions communicate the highest official narrative of 
Chinese intentions to its own people and the world, one must consider Chi-
na’s constitutions to understand both China’s view of its own role in the 
world as well as the normative bases of Chinese foreign policy. 
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